What Iran’s Internet Shutdown Reveals About Starlink

We are increasingly witnessing governments shutting down the internet around the world as methods of control and repression. When this occurs, governments are not acting outside the bounds of the system; they are pulling on levers that already exist and are built into law, licensing, and spectrum management.

Governments don’t simply employ these levers hastily in moments of crisis; these are standing authorities embedded in how digital infrastructure is governed and deployed. This reality has created space for technosolutionist responses, such as Elon Musk’s Starlink, to step in and market themselves as fixes. The logic is deceptively simple: If governments can shut down terrestrial networks, then connectivity must be rerouted. This is why satellite internet, in particular low-earth-orbit (LEO) systems, was framed as an alternative that was censorship-resistant, borderless, and immune to state power. The 2026 internet shutdown in Iran exposes the limits of this framing and reveals that satellite internet is not immune to disruption and that it is embedded in the same systems of sovereignty and control.