The Ukraine effect: demise or rebirth of the global order? - The Interpreter

The Ukraine effect: demise or rebirth of the global order? | Lowy Institute

The Ukraine effect: demise or rebirth of the global order?

- The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sharpened the commitment of Western governments to a liberal vision of international order. But it is a different story elsewhere. Many countries, particularly in the Global South, regard the rules-based order as an artificial Western construct, and the Ukraine war as a matter of geopolitics rather than norms and principles.
- Events in Ukraine have reinforced Washington’s views about two competing visions of global order — one democratic, the other autocratic. However, such binarism has little resonance beyond the West. For the Global South, the divide that matters is with the Global North. This is not only about relative influence and status in the international system, but also diverging priorities.
- A rules-based international order is achievable, but not as commonly imagined in the West. The post-Cold War template of unalloyed US global leadership and Western-dominated institutions is no longer tenable. The only viable order is one that is more inclusive and representative, reflecting a world where power is increasingly diffuse, and global cooperation is critical in meeting threats such as climate change and human insecurity.

Introduction

The world is facing a Zeitenwende: an epochal tectonic shift. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has put an end to an era. New powers have emerged or re-emerged, including an economically strong and politically assertive China. In this new multipolar world, different countries and models of government are competing for power and influence.

Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany

Viewed from Western capitals, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is the most consequential event in world affairs since the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991. On its outcome hang the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign state, the future of European security, the credibility of the West, and the preservation of the rules-based international order.

But for much of the world, the Ukraine conflict does not portend the “epochal tectonic shift” described by Chancellor Scholz. It is not an elemental struggle between good and evil, but an unwelcome distraction that diverts attention from more pressing priorities, such as climate change, food insecurity, debt relief, and public health.

Against this polarised backdrop, I want to address two broad questions. First, what has been the impact of the Ukraine war on global order? Does it amount to a real game changer, as Scholz and other Western leaders claim, or is it more a reflection of existing trends — the steady erosion of international norms, escalating great power tensions, and global fragmentation?

The Ukraine war is a globally significant event that will exert a lasting influence on the shape of international order.

Second, what is the future of international order? Does Putin’s war herald an age of anarchy or has it, paradoxically, strengthened the case for order by reminding us of what the world stands to lose by its absence? This, in turn, raises the question of what kind of order we have in mind. Are we witnessing a resurgence of the post-Cold War, US-led model — the “rules-based international order” as understood in the West? Or is global governance undergoing a transformation, reflecting the profound shifts in power that have occurred over the past decade, in particular the rise of China and the growing influence of the Global South?

In this essay, I argue that the Ukraine war is a globally significant event that will exert a lasting influence on the shape of international order. It is a pivotal historical “moment”. Yet what is involved is not a simple binary choice between order and disorder. A Putin victory would kill off any prospect of a rules-based international order. Brute force will have prevailed, and anarchy — an “age of impunity”

Order, what order?

Before considering the “Ukraine effect”, we should establish what is meant by international order. All governments profess allegiance to the idea of order and agree that this functions on the basis of certain rules and norms. But what order are we talking about? Who makes the rules? And to whom do they apply?

In the West, the “rules-based international order” has acquired an iconic status as a self-evident truth, requiring little elaboration beyond its framing as the polar opposite of “might is right”.

Today, the United States remains the world’s leading power, and its influence on the international system is unparalleled by that of any other country. However, its dominance has diminished steadily over the past three decades. Its rules are increasingly and successfully challenged — not only by major powers, such as China and Russia, but even by the weakest and most backward of states. Western leaders have sought to legitimise the rules-based international order by anchoring it in the principles of the UN Charter, insisting that such an order is not a Western construct, but universal in its application. But few non-Western governments buy this. For them, the “rules-based international order” is driven by Western interests, centred in Western power, and observed or ignored by the West whenever it feels like it.

Western leaders have sought to legitimise the rules-based international order by anchoring it in the principles of the UN Charter.

So where does this leave us? Perhaps the most practical definition of international order is one of the more venerable. Nearly a half-century ago, the great Australian scholar Hedley Bull argued that an international society existed when “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values … conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions”. This set it apart from an international system, whereby “states … may be in contact with each other and interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other’s calculations without their being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves to be bound by a common set of rules, or co-operating in the working of common institutions”.

Bull believed that a rules-based international society was in place even during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in long-term strategic and ideological confrontation. The standard he applied was broad agreement over the rules of the game. As he put it, “most states at most times pay some respect to the basic rules of coexistence, such as mutual respect for sovereignty, the rule that agreements should be kept, and rules limiting resort to violence”.

In this essay, when I speak of a “Ukraine effect” on global order, I mean order in the Hedley Bull sense. Of course, Bull was writing at a time when the two superpowers were able, in varying degrees, to enforce their visions of order. That is scarcely the case today. There are many more active and influential players in the international system; power itself is more diffuse than in centuries; and consensus is much harder to achieve. Nevertheless, Bull’s core principle still holds true: order implies some level of mutual understanding about the rules of engagement and co-existence, while disorder occurs when these break down — as exemplified by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Ukraine war and international order

Putin’s invasion has been a fiasco. Russia has suffered huge losses of men, materiel, and reputation. The war has weakened its position in the world. Moscow is more dependent than ever on Beijing. The Biden administration, which had been struggling in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is revitalised. Transatlantic ties have been boosted, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rediscovering a sense of mission. And the idea of a unitary West has been strengthened.

But Western policymakers face at least two major challenges. The most immediate is to maintain the impressive consensus they have managed so far. Despite Russia’s military reverses, Putin has shown no sign of backing down. On the contrary, the war has assumed the guise of an existential struggle, akin to the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45, which cannot be lost whatever the human cost.

The second challenge is no less daunting: to persuade the non-Western world that the war in Ukraine is not just another European conflict but goes to the very future of international order. In theory, there is consensus on this, particularly when it comes to preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states. Shortly after the start of Putin’s “special military operation”, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) voted overwhelmingly to condemn the Russian invasion, and it acted similarly after Putin announced the “independence” of four Ukrainian provinces in September 2022, and again on the first anniversary of the invasion on 23 February 2023.

Non-Western countries are also reluctant to get involved because they do not see the Russian invasion as uniquely evil.

But in practice, many non-Western countries maintain a neutral, almost agnostic stance. There were 35 abstentions in each of the first two UNGA votes, plus several absences. And it was much the same story with the third vote (32 abstentions, with two former abstainers voting against the resolution). Some governments acted out of self-interest, wishing neither to alienate Moscow nor to be seen to back a flagrant breach of the UN Charter. But others believed that Ukraine was not their problem and was instead part of the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West.

Non-Western countries are also reluctant to get involved because they do not see the Russian invasion as uniquely evil — as they see it, the invasion is no worse than other military ventures such as the US-led intervention in Afghanistan post-9/11, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011.

Such whataboutism irritates Western observers but reflects a widespread belief that major powers, in particular, are guided by interests rather than moral principle or international norms.

The linkage Western governments draw between the war in Ukraine and the fate of international order elicits a cynical reaction in many non-Western countries.

Then there is the charge that the West only invokes values when its interests are at stake, while ignoring breaches of international order when they are not.

In short, the linkage Western governments draw between the war in Ukraine and the fate of international order elicits a cynical reaction in many non-Western countries. They reject the assumption of moral superiority by the United States and Europe. They see no reason to sacrifice their interests for the sake of a “rules-based international order” that has little meaning for them. They recognise that the war has had globally destabilising consequences but blame Western sanctions against Moscow as much as Putin’s invasion for these outcomes.

US–China strategic rivalry

One might imagine that the Ukraine war would have taken some of the heat out of US–China strategic rivalry. Washington has had to focus primarily on events in Ukraine. The war has exposed the limits of Sino–Russian partnership (the so-called “no limits friendship”). Beijing has so far refrained from supplying Moscow with weapons

Yet there has been no relaxation of US–China tensions, which are now more acute than in half a century. There are several reasons for the lack of a Ukraine “dividend” in the relationship. First, Washington sees China as the only power with the capability and will to challenge US global primacy. Although the Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy distinguishes between Russia as a direct threat and China as a long-term strategic challenge, China remains the great “other”, far more formidable than a declining Russia.

Second, over the past year Beijing has significantly ratcheted up its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activity around Taiwan and in the Western Pacific, leading to heightened fears of military confrontation. The escalation following the August 2022 visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei raised red flags about impending Chinese aggression. There is a subtext, too, which is that Beijing has exploited the distraction of the Ukraine war to advance its goals in the Indo-Pacific.

Third, China’s stance on the Ukraine crisis has scarcely been impartial, but instead pro-Putin, blaming the United States and NATO for “provoking” the invasion. The spectre of a Sino–Russian axis of authoritarians remains very much alive in Washington.

Xi is more committed than ever to securing the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland; asserting Chinese primacy in Asia; and building up China as a global power.

Xi aims to maximise China’s strategic flexibility. Accordingly, he has sought to improve its international image and reach out to the West.

Crucially, though, the Ukraine war has not led to any rethinking of China’s goals. Xi is more committed than ever to securing the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland; asserting Chinese primacy in Asia; and building up China as a global power. His recent public diplomacy in no way represents a mea culpa for past actions but is a response to significant changes in China’s operating environment. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, slowing economic growth, and demographic decline, the confrontational “wolf-warrior” approach of recent years has been modified.

But there should be no illusions. Xi and other Chinese Communist Party leaders view international politics through a competitive prism and remain highly suspicious of Western influence and aims. This mistrust is fully reciprocated in Washington. The brouhaha over the Chinese spy balloon in February this year, and US claims that Beijing is contemplating lethal military support to Russia, exemplify a relationship that continues to deteriorate. The war in Ukraine may not have been a game changer in this respect, but it has crystallised core differences between Washington and Beijing, including over the future of international order.

A tale of two divides

DEMOCRACIES VERSUS Autocracies

From the outset of his presidency, Biden has drawn a clear distinction between two competing visions of global order — one democratic, the other autocratic.

The war in Ukraine has encouraged Washington to amplify the dangers posed by authoritarian powers. The message is that the differences between democracies and autocracies are not simply political or ideological but have real consequences for international security. While China may not be a direct participant in the war, its support for Russia is fuelling the conflict. It is also escalating its aggressive activities in the Indo-Pacific and is committed to overturning the rules-based international order.

Washington’s binarism, however, has had limited resonance beyond America. Close European allies, such as Germany and France, are disappointed by Beijing’s rhetorical support for Putin, and recognise that China presents a growing challenge to Western interests. But this has not stopped them from wanting to do business with it. Scholz and Macron were accompanied by large business delegations during their respective visits to Beijing. They see cooperative engagement with China as not only possible, but necessary. Macron, in particular, has distanced himself from Washington’s hard line, arguing that Europe should resist becoming a “follower” of America and taking its cue on Taiwan.

US allies in Asia are less enthusiastic still. Some, notably Singapore, have openly criticised the notion of dividing the world between democracies and autocracies.

Unsurprisingly, non-aligned countries reject (or ignore) Biden’s binarism. The course of the Ukraine war has only confirmed them in their convictions.

Australia’s own position encapsulates the conundrum facing many US allies in Asia. Canberra is committed to consolidating close political and security ties with America, notably through strategic frameworks such as AUKUS. But China remains by far Australia’s largest trading partner. Since the government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese came to office in May 2022, high-level diplomatic contacts with Beijing have resumed. Albanese had a separate bilateral meeting with Xi at the Bali G20 summit, and Foreign Minister Penny Wong visited Beijing in December 2022. While Australia will always stand much closer to the United States than to China, it is clearly reluctant to make hard binary choices.

Unsurprisingly, non-aligned countries reject (or ignore) Biden’s binarism. The course of the Ukraine war has only confirmed them in their convictions. Whatever their misgivings over Putin’s actions, few are keen to see a triumphant West. They would much rather a world where US and Western power is counterbalanced by other centres of influence.

The North–South divide

There is, however, another form of binarism exerting a growing influence on global order — the separation between the Global North and the Global South. This divide is hardly new, having existed since the age of imperialism (if not earlier), and it was highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The expression “Global South” is somewhat problematic since it encompasses such a disparate assortment of countries. Historically, it was associated with what used to be called the “Third World” (i.e. developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America). But today it also covers major powers such as China and India, wealthy authoritarian states such as Saudi Arabia, and key regional players such as Türkiye and Brazil.

That said, the Global South is hardly a scientifically rigorous term, and there are obvious downsides to generalising on the basis of it. So why employ it? The main justification is that it has become common usage. It may be intellectually suspect, but it is politically relevant and influential, nonetheless. Many countries self-identify as belonging to the Global South, and the concept has been endorsed by the United Nations through its Office for South–South Cooperation (UNOSSC).

The war in Ukraine has accentuated the North–South divide. This is not only about relative influence and status within the international system, but also different priorities. Whereas Western leaders are preoccupied by Russia’s disruption of the European security order and by the rise of China, most of their counterparts in the Global South are focused principally on economic and developmental challenges, such as debt relief, food security, and mitigating the effects of climate change.

More concretely, the Ukraine conflict has had a number of adverse consequences for Global South countries. It has narrowed the policy bandwidth of Western decision-makers. Issues of primary concern to the Global South, such as climate financing, food security, and debt relief have been deprioritised. Relatedly, the war has sucked in financial resources that, in more peaceful times, might have been allocated elsewhere. Western governments have significantly increased defence spending to meet the additional requirements generated by Russian aggression. Regular aid budgets have been cut and funds diverted to Ukraine from the usual recipients. To date, the United States has given more than US$75 billion in direct military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine — twice its entire overseas aid budget for 2021 (US$38 billion).

Although North–South tensions over climate financing pre-date events in Ukraine, the war has aggravated them.

The North–South divide was brought into sharp relief at last year’s COP27 Climate Change Conference in Egypt. Long-standing resentment over the failure of the richest nations to fulfil their financial obligations to aid the energy transition of poor countries was exacerbated by Western reluctance to approve a “loss-and-damage” facility to compensate these countries for the environmental and economic costs of climate change. The G77 bloc of (mostly) developing countries threatened to derail the summit, and to abandon the commitment in the 2015 Paris Agreement to limit the rise in global temperatures to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2100. In the end, a deal of sorts was cobbled together — a loss-and-damage mechanism was approved, but with no sums or sources of funding specified. The ill-feeling and mutual mistrust from the summit were striking.

Although North–South tensions over climate financing pre-date events in Ukraine, the war has aggravated them. Viewed from the Global South, COP27 highlighted a consistent pattern of dismissive behaviour by the West, following on from the failures of vaccine distribution during the Covid-19 pandemic, reluctance to engage seriously on debt relief, and cuts to humanitarian assistance. Western leaders expect the Global South to be vitally interested in the priorities they identify as most important — defending the “rules-based international order”, defeating Russia, countering China, and saving the planet — but make little effort to reciprocate when it comes to the concerns of developing countries.

Where now for international order?

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance, the energetic US response to the war, and the unexpected resolve of the Europeans have given new impetus to the idea of a rules-based international order. Certainly, if any of these elements had been absent, we might already be talking about its demise. Yet the job is far from done. The 2022 US National Security Strategy speaks of a “decisive decade” coming up.

Four variables will be key in determining the outcome, including whether an international order emerges at all. The first variable is the course of the war in Ukraine. The second is the evolution of US–China relations. The third variable centres on how far the Global South is brought into international governance. And finally, the viability of any order will be contingent on its capacity to address a twenty-first century agenda that prioritises climate action, food security, public health, and economic and social justice.

Resolving the Ukraine war

This is really about getting past first base. If Putin wins in Ukraine, the concept of a rules-based international order would be delegitimised. Military might will have won out, and the West’s political and moral reputation would be shredded.

It is not just the liberal vision of a rules-based international order that would be a casualty of a Putin victory in Ukraine. The very notion of an international order in which states “conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” — the definition proposed by Hedley Bull in 1977 — would suffer immense damage. To tolerate a Putin win would be to allow him to exceed the limits that even the Soviet Union largely observed during the Cold War. (Unlike Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ukraine has been a sovereign independent state for more than three decades.) Russia today is far weaker and less influential than the USSR was during the Cold War, yet Putin has felt emboldened to overturn the status quo in a way that his Soviet predecessors would scarcely have risked.

Some commentators have suggested that there is a deal to be made with Moscow. One common idea is a return to the status quo before 24 February 2022, the date of Putin’s invasion. Ukraine would get back most of the territories it had lost, while Russia would keep Crimea and those parts of the Donbass it has occupied since 2014–15. The United States and NATO would provide Russia with security guarantees, including a prominent place in a revised European security architecture. Ukraine would be formally neutral and have no prospect of joining NATO.

Unfortunately, a settlement on such terms is not only immoral, but most of all impractical. It would reward Russian aggression, cripple Ukraine for years, fatally undermine the post-Cold War European order, and fuel the Sino–Russian partnership. It would be seen by all parties, and the outside world, as a Ukrainian defeat and Western capitulation. It would also settle nothing, since Moscow would aim to “improve” the deal at the first opportunity. After all, this is exactly what it has done since it annexed Crimea nearly a decade ago.

Some kind of Ukrainian victory, then, is needed. But it is unclear what this would look like. Would it entail the return of all territories annexed by Russia since February 2014, namely, the whole of the Donbass region and Crimea? And how far should the West’s obligations extend? There are no easy fixes. All potential solutions carry risk, including of military escalation. Putin has shown no inclination to compromise and is in for the long haul. The only satisfactory outcome for him is the same as on day one of the invasion: a decisive victory. In this climate, Western talk of “pragmatism” and “off-ramps” misses the point. Quite rightly, Moscow interprets this as weakness.

The obstacles to a resolution of the Ukraine war are enormous and may prove insurmountable. Nevertheless, there are steps the West can and must take, not just to help Ukraine, but also itself and the cause of a functioning international order — “liberal” or other. The most immediate priority is to increase military support (short of providing combat troops) to enable Ukraine to drive Russian troops from the occupied territories. That means boosting Ukraine’s capabilities with the most advanced NATO equipment, including fighter aircraft, tanks, and anti-air missile systems. Continuing prevarication on the grounds that this might lead to a wider conflict is misconceived, since such inaction feeds Putin’s belief that he can outlast or spook Western leaders.

Western governments should also be thinking about how a post-war Ukraine would fit within a European order. NATO needs to apply an Article V-type provision to guarantee Ukraine’s territorial integrity from future attack,

Western governments cannot afford to be precious about Chinese influence unless they are prepared to fund the whole enterprise themselves.

The West will need to commit long-term funds to aid Ukraine’s reconstruction. To this end, it should welcome the participation of other parties, such as China and the Gulf states. Although this goes against the grain, given US–China tensions and ongoing suspicions about Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, the immensity of the rebuilding task will require many hands to the pump. Western governments cannot afford to be precious about Chinese influence unless they are prepared to fund the whole enterprise themselves — an unfeasible prospect given that the costs of reconstruction could amount to US$1 trillion.

Finally, there is the issue of what to do about Russia. Where and how does it fit within a post-war European and global order? This subject deserves separate and detailed treatment. But it is worth flagging a few contours. One principle is that Russia should not be afforded special treatment by virtue of its size or nuclear arsenal or historic claims to “greatness”. This is not about punishing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine but is a question of practicalities. For a rules-based international order to work, the rules themselves have to be anchored in some kind of reality and a plausible vision of stability. Giving Russia an effective right of veto over European security (in particular), and buffing up its sense of strategic self-entitlement, would achieve neither.

Conversely, there is little to be gained — and much to lose — by consigning Russia to long-term pariah status. The accent needs to be on helping Ukraine rather than penalising Russia, although there is naturally some overlap between these goals. Western governments should avoid the temptation of attempting to extract swingeing reparations from Moscow, pursuing war crimes indictments against Russian leaders, and linking future cooperation to progress on democratisation in Russia. It will be hard enough trying to achieve peace in Ukraine, and a more or less rule-abiding Russia, without being distracted by secondary and unenforceable goals.

Stabilising US–China relations

The longer the Ukraine war drags on, the more problematic the US–China relationship will become. Both sides desire an early end to the conflict but hope for very different outcomes. Each understands that the course of the war has implications for the global order and for the relative distribution of power and influence within it. The big task ahead is mutually reinforcing: to ensure that ongoing US–China tensions do not exacerbate the situation in Ukraine; and to limit the fall-out from the war on their relationship. Fail in this endeavour, and even a minimalist international order based on “rules of the game” would be a remote prospect.

On the plus side, Beijing appears reluctant to go down the path of military confrontation. Partly, this is because it judges that the time is not right. The Communist Party leadership faces a formidable array of challenges, from revitalising economic growth to managing China’s demographic crisis to renovating its international image. Despite constant talk about Western decline, there is little confidence in Beijing that China would win a kinetic war against the United States, and even bullish commentators recognise that it is far from ready to assume global leadership.

In the meantime, Beijing has a vested interest in international stability. China remains deeply integrated into — and dependent on — the global economy. The United States, the European Union, and Japan buy nearly 40 per cent of its exports.

Beijing must be left in no doubt that if it invades Taiwan, the United States will intervene militarily.

The United States and other Western governments can exploit China’s continuing need for order. The goal should be not to improve human rights in China or to get Xi to rein in Putin — neither of which is achievable — but to establish functional engagement in key areas: deconfliction in the Western Pacific; strategic dialogue, including on arms control; climate policy; and trade rules, especially relating to intellectual property. US–China relations will still be defined more by competition than cooperation. But the point would be to ensure that this competition is manageable and does not degenerate into military confrontation. In other words, to preserve some level of international order based on minimum rules of the game.

Of course, this is easier said than done. The differences between Washington and Beijing are so great, and levels of mutual mistrust and loathing so high, that it is tempting to dismiss the case as hopeless and prepare instead for inevitable major war.

The United States should pick its fights with China. To pursue a relentlessly critical approach towards Beijing, as has been the practice of the Trump and Biden administrations, actually lets it off the hook.

Four things, in particular, will be necessary. First, messages should be clearly communicated. For example, Beijing must be left in no doubt that if it invades Taiwan, the United States will intervene militarily. Such a message should not be broadcast, since this would make it much harder for the Chinese leadership to back down, but would be conveyed through back-channels. Formally, the “strategic ambiguity” that defines US policy on Taiwan would remain in place but would give way in practice to strategic clarity about Washington’s intentions. This is critical since the biggest risk of confrontation is from misperceptions and miscalculation, rather than because leaders in Washington or Beijing actively seek war.

Second, the United States should pick its fights with China. To pursue a relentlessly critical approach towards Beijing, as has been the practice of the Trump and Biden administrations, actually lets it off the hook. Washington is right to condemn the PLA’s dangerous actions around Taiwan and in the South China Sea, China’s threatening behaviour towards some of its neighbours, and the theft of intellectual property from Western companies. But in other areas, Washington’s interventions have been less useful. Finger-pointing over Chinese climate policy is rich given America’s poor record of fulfilling its financing commitments under the Paris Agreement and its continuing exploration, development, and export of fossil fuels.

The future of US–China relations — and a viable international order — will depend on developing some sort of cooperative agenda.

Third, China needs a reasonable prospect of playing a centrally influential role in global governance.

Finally, the future of US–China relations — and a viable international order — will depend on developing some sort of cooperative agenda. Engagement needs to go beyond mere troubleshooting. One encouraging sign in recent years has been the resilience of economic cooperation in the face of deteriorating political and security relations, with bilateral trade in 2022 reaching an all-time high of US$691 billion.

Bringing in the Global South

The long-term viability of any international order will depend on the extent to which countries in the Global South are invested in it. The stand-off between the G77 and Western governments at COP27 highlighted a new will and capacity to self-organise in defence of their own interests. Similarly, their responses to the war in Ukraine show they will not meekly follow the West’s lead but will seek to maximise their strategic independence and flexibility. Notwithstanding its disparateness, the Global South has emerged as a genuine constituency, courted by the West, China, and Russia.

It will be a huge challenge for the West (“North”) to mend bridges with the Global South and redress the damage caused to Western interests by the growing inequality between rich and poor countries, the mishandling of vaccine distribution to the developing world during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the marginalisation of Global South interests. This will necessitate a complex rebuilding process, involving the reform of international institutions, greater attention and resources to developing country priorities, and a change of mindset. Even in the best-case scenario, there is little likelihood that Global South countries will subscribe to the liberal vision of a rules-based international order. But what is achievable, although still difficult, is encouraging a more coordinated and effective approach in areas such as climate policy and human insecurity (including the management of refugees).

Institutional reform

For decades, developing countries were treated largely as objects of international diplomacy rather than actors with serious agendas. They were present in large numbers in the UN General Assembly, but their influence in decision-making bodies — the UN Security Council, the IMF and World Bank, and later the G20 — was negligible. That situation is unsustainable. As its aggregate footprint expands amid a general diffusion of international power, the Global South is demanding an influence commensurate with its enhanced profile.

So far, however, Western acknowledgement of this reality has been essentially rhetorical. Although Biden has called for the African Union to be allocated a permanent seat in the G20,

The policy agenda

More important still than institutional reform is an increased focus on priorities that matter most to developing countries. And with greater attention must come more money. COP27 demonstrated that the foot-dragging of the West on “loss-and-damage” and energy transition finance cannot continue.

Overseas aid is another area where the West must do better. It is of course right to address the needs of Ukrainian refugees and provide military and economic support to Kyiv. But when this comes at the expense of aid to other countries and regions, the damage is not only reputational. There are strategic consequences. Western parsimony has made it easier for China to position itself as the moral conscience and economic leader of the Global South. If American and European policymakers are serious about countering Chinese influence, they cannot do so on the cheap. Initiatives such as the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, with its promises of US$600 billion in project financing, are meaningless if there is no sign of the actual funds.

Changing the mindset

There needs to be a sea-change in the mentality of the West when engaging with the countries of the Global South. The most serious failing has been to view them almost as children, seduced and manipulated by outside powers with malign intentions. The trope about China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” exemplifies this patronising attitude. Yet even the weakest of states retain some agency. And they are offended by those who suggest otherwise, and whose interest in them is largely instrumental.

Developing countries welcome foreign investment in infrastructure, natural resources, weapons systems, security, and technology, not out of ideological sympathy with their donors or lenders, but because they see it as being in their best interests. Though the outcomes may not always be desirable, their governments generally behave as rational actors. It is pointless for Western leaders to complain about Beijing’s ulterior motives if they are not prepared to match or better what the Chinese are offering.

Pursuing a twenty-first century global agenda

With the Ukraine war absorbing so much attention and resources, it is hard to be optimistic about the future of a twenty-first century global agenda, centred on climate policy, food security, and human development. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, geopolitical and hard security issues will absorb the attention of Western decision-makers for the foreseeable future. US–China strategic rivalry is set to escalate, and Russia–West relations will be damaged for years, most likely decades. Net-zero carbon targets will remain in place, but there is little reason to believe they will be reached, given the dilution of practical measures for their implementation.

This grim state of affairs has led some observers to argue that the immediate priority should be to resolve great power tensions in order to provide a foundation for global problem-solving.

Defence spending and force modernisation are critical to ensuring national security for many states, including Australia.

Of course, responsible government involves planning for eventualities, such as possible major war. Defence spending and force modernisation are critical to ensuring national security for many states, including Australia. But the sums lavished on such priorities vastly outweigh funding for other essential tasks. To cite one example, in December 2022, the US Congress overwhelmingly approved a defence budget of US$858 billion. By contrast, a US$1.7 trillion spending bill around the same time allocated just US$1 billion to help poor countries to adapt to energy transition — less than a tenth of the very modest sum Biden had promised at the UN General Assembly four months earlier.

This failure is not surprising in light of US political realities and the fact that much of the Republican Party regards climate change as a pernicious myth, and transition from fossil fuels as unpatriotic. But it also reflects a wider problem, which is that leaders of all stripes and all nations struggle to address challenges where there is no clear “enemy”. So, they fall back on default responses. It was far easier for Donald Trump to blame Beijing for the “China virus” and “kung flu” than to address chronic problems in the US public health system or risk alienating his base. Similarly, for the Biden administration it is a no-brainer to boost defence spending in response to the threat posed by identifiable external enemies, principally China, and to appeal to the American worker by emphasising “fair” rather than free trade.

Non-conventional threats, such as climate change and food insecurity, require policymakers to think and act counterintuitively. That means resisting the lure of short-term political expediency. It means accepting that, in many cases, the most lethal danger is not a specific country but something transnational and even universal. It involves recognising that many problems lie closer to home — whether it is the failure to curb fossil fuel emissions

Conclusion

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most flagrant breach of the UN Charter since North Korea crossed the 38th parallel in 1950. It has sparked the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. And its consequences have been truly global. No country, however remote or seemingly disconnected, has been left untouched by events in Ukraine.

But if the war has been globally consequential, there is no consensus on what it means for the future of international order. On the one hand, it has sharpened the commitment of Western governments to liberal values, norms, and institutions. What was once taken for granted is no longer so. Indeed, for some commentators, the choice is now an elemental one pitting democracy against barbarism, order versus nihilism.

A rules-based international order is still feasible, but it will need to be much more representative and global.

The outcome of the Ukraine war will be critical for the future of international order. But not in the sense generally understood in the West. The liberal “rules-based international order” is obsolete, at least in its post-Cold War universalist form. This was the product of a specific time, when US power was at its zenith and Washington was able and keen to implement its expansive vision of order. Those circumstances no longer pertain. The United States is still the pre-eminent power, but international power and authority have become much more diffuse. The template of unalloyed US global leadership and Western-dominated multilateral institutions has lost legitimacy and is no longer tenable. A rules-based international order is still feasible, but it will need to be much more representative and global. As the scholar Rachel Tausendfreund noted even before the Ukraine war, “Western leaders will have to make room for others to shape the rules.”

This will be hard to swallow in the current climate. The horrors of Putin’s invasion, China’s aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific, and the escalation of geopolitical tensions favour more instinctive responses: strengthening alliances; expanding and modernising defence capabilities; increasing economic resilience; and pursuing strategic containment. Much of this will indeed be necessary. But unless there is also a greater willingness to work with the unconverted, with rivals, and even enemies, to develop rough rules of the game, there will be no international order at all. We would be condemned to live in a Hobbesian state of anarchy, marked by ever more numerous and serious conflicts, and a near total failure to address the huge challenges facing all of us.
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