But Their Signal Chats: Trump Officials Share War Plans With Journalist
Look, I know you’ve probably already seen yesterday’s absolutely stunning story from Jeffrey Goldberg at The Atlantic. The one where Trump administration officials somehow managed to add a journalist to their Signal group chat while planning out their bombing of the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The one that reads like a plot point rejected from VEEP for being too unrealistic.
But having spent 24 hours watching various hot takes and attempts to minimize just how catastrophically bad this security breach was, we need to talk about why this is even worse than most people realize.
First, just look at the casual way these officials discuss highly classified military operations. This isn’t just a quick “oops wrong number” text – this is an extended conversation about bombing plans happening on an unauthorized platform. And the deeper you read, the worse it gets:
At 8:05 a.m. on Friday, March 14, “Michael Waltz” texted the group: “Team, you should have a statement of conclusions with taskings per the Presidents guidance this morning in your high side inboxes.” (High side, in government parlance, refers to classified computer and communications systems.) “State and DOD, we developed suggested notification lists for regional Allies and partners. Joint Staff is sending this am a more specific sequence of events in the coming days and we will work w DOD to ensure COS, OVP and POTUS are briefed.”
At this point, a fascinating policy discussion commenced. The account labeled “JD Vance” responded at 8:16: “Team, I am out for the day doing an economic event in Michigan. But I think we are making a mistake.” (Vance was indeed in Michigan that day.) The Vance account goes on to state, “3 percent of US trade runs through the suez. 40 percent of European trade does. There is a real risk that the public doesn’t understand this or why it’s necessary. The strongest reason to do this is, as POTUS said, to send a message.”
The Vance account then goes on to make a noteworthy statement, considering that the vice president has not deviated publicly from Trump’s position on virtually any issue. “I am not sure the president is aware how inconsistent this is with his message on Europe right now. There’s a further risk that we see a moderate to severe spike in oil prices. I am willing to support the consensus of the team and keep these concerns to myself. But there is a strong argument for delaying this a month, doing the messaging work on why this matters, seeing where the economy is, etc.”
A person identified in Signal as “Joe Kent” (Trump’s nominee to run the National Counterterrorism Center is named Joe Kent) wrote at 8:22, “There is nothing time sensitive driving the time line. We’ll have the exact same options in a month.”
Then, at 8:26 a.m., a message landed in my Signal app from the user “John Ratcliffe.” The message contained information that might be interpreted as related to actual and current intelligence operations.
At 8:27, a message arrived from the “Pete Hegseth” account. “VP: I understand your concerns – and fully support you raising w/ POTUS. Important considerations, most of which are tough to know how they play out (economy, Ukraine peace, Gaza, etc). I think messaging is going to be tough no matter what – nobody knows who the Houthis are – which is why we would need to stay focused on: 1) Biden failed & 2) Iran funded.”
The Hegseth message goes on to state, “Waiting a few weeks or a month does not fundamentally change the calculus. 2 immediate risks on waiting: 1) this leaks, and we look indecisive; 2) Israel takes an action first – or Gaza cease fire falls apart – and we don’t get to start this on our own terms. We can manage both. We are prepared to execute, and if I had final go or no go vote, I believe we should. This [is] not about the Houthis. I see it as two things: 1) Restoring Freedom of Navigation, a core national interest; and 2) Reestablish deterrence, which Biden cratered. But, we can easily pause. And if we do, I will do all we can to enforce 100% OPSEC”—operations security. “I welcome other thoughts.”
100% OPSEC indeed. Remember, this is the Secretary of Defense (who we all knew was unqualified for the job) literally promising perfect operational security while inadvertently sharing war plans with a journalist over a non-governmental communications system.
And remember — this is just what Goldberg was comfortable sharing publicly. He notes that some messages were too sensitive to publish, containing operational details that “could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel.” Think about that for a moment: these top officials were casually texting information so sensitive that even after the fact, a journalist felt publishing it would endanger lives.
This isn’t just incompetence — though it certainly demonstrates how the rank amateurs Trump put into power are catastrophically unqualified for their jobs. This is criminal negligence with national security implications.
Under 18 USC 793, “gross negligence” in handling defense information carries up to ten years in prison. And this case goes way beyond mere negligence — they deliberately chose to conduct classified military planning on an unauthorized platform, then accidentally broadcast it to a journalist. That’s before we even get to the numerous other laws likely violated here.
While some members of Congress, including a few Republicans, are appropriately alarmed by this breach, the GOP leadership is desperately trying to minimize it. Take Rep. Don Bacon, an Armed Services Committee member and former Air Force brigadier general, who actually told Axios: “I’ve accidentally sent the wrong person a text. We all have.”
This kind of false equivalence is both dangerous and stupid. This wasn’t a misdirected happy birthday text, you dipshit. This was classified military planning conducted over a third-party messaging app. Yes, Signal’s encryption is excellent — but that’s completely beside the point. There’s a reason the government has specific secured communications systems, SCIFs, and strict protocols for handling classified information.
Even more concerning than Bacon’s clueless response is House Speaker Mike Johnson’s attempt to downplay this massive security breach: “They’re gonna track that down and make sure that doesn’t happen again…. Clearly, I think the administration has acknowledged it was a mistake and they’ll tighten up.”
This wasn’t some minor technical slip-up that just needs a policy reminder. This was top officials deliberately choosing to conduct classified military planning on unauthorized systems. The fact that they accidentally included a journalist just exposed what they were doing — but the underlying violation was using Signal in the first place.
And here’s what should really keep you up at night: we only know about this because they happened to add a journalist who went public about this single chat. How many other sensitive conversations are happening on Signal or other unauthorized platforms? How many other “accidental” additions might have gone unnoticed? How many foreign intelligence services are already exploiting this administration’s casual approach to operational security?
Let’s put this in perspective: this is the same Trump team that turned “but her emails” into a movement over Hillary Clinton’s private email server. We were critical of Clinton’s server too — it was a legitimately bad security practice. But what we’re seeing here makes Clinton’s server look like amateur hour.
Clinton used a private server for mostly unclassified State Department business, with a handful of retroactively classified emails found in the mix. These guys are literally planning military strikes over Signal, complete with operational details so sensitive that journalists won’t even publish them. And they’re doing it specifically to dodge both security protocols and federal records laws.
The private server versus Signal distinction matters too. Clinton’s setup, while improper, was at least a dedicated system. These officials are just using a consumer app, making it virtually impossible to properly archive communications as required by law. They’re not just mishandling classified info — they’re deliberately choosing tools that help them hide their tracks.
And, yes, pretty much all of the officials in the chat are on record screaming about supposed security failures during Democratic administrations. CNN put together an incredible supercut of a bunch of these dipshits screaming about security breaches from Democrats:
Though, my favorite may be this tweet from Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard (a member of the group chat) from just ten days ago saying “any unauthorized release of classified information is a violation of the law and will be treated as such.”
Huh, maybe someone should get on responding to this lawbreaking that you were a part of then.
And then there’s Donald Trump’s telling response to this security nightmare. After first trying to dismiss the story by attacking The Atlantic (“a magazine that is going out of business”), Trump pivots to what he thinks is the only relevant point: “Well, it couldn’t have been very effective, because the attack was very effective.”
Think about that for a moment. The man who led “lock her up” chants over Clinton’s email server — who insisted the mere existence of a private server was disqualifying regardless of any actual harm — is now arguing that leaking classified military plans is fine as long as the operation still succeeded.
This is the same Trump who once claimed Clinton’s email practices were “bigger than Watergate.” The same Trump who said anyone mishandling classified information should be disqualified from public service. Now he’s shrugging off his own officials literally texting war plans to random journalists because hey, the bombing worked out okay in the end.
Some Trump defenders are trying to minimize this by claiming the published excerpts only show policy debate among senior officials. But Goldberg’s reporting makes clear just how dangerous this breach was:
At 11:44 a.m., the account labeled “Pete Hegseth” posted in Signal a “TEAM UPDATE.” I will not quote from this update, or from certain other subsequent texts. The information contained in them, if they had been read by an adversary of the United States, could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel, particularly in the broader Middle East, Central Command’s area of responsibility. What I will say, in order to illustrate the shocking recklessness of this Signal conversation, is that the Hegseth post contained operational details of forthcoming strikes on Yemen, including information about targets, weapons the U.S. would be deploying, and attack sequencing.
Let that sink in. These weren’t just policy discussions — these were detailed military plans so sensitive that publishing them could endanger American lives. And they were being casually shared on Signal, where any “accidental” addition could have accessed them.
Remember Benghazi? Republicans spent years investigating Obama administration officials over that attack. They held endless hearings, demanded countless documents, and threw around accusations of criminal negligence and security failures. Now imagine if they’d discovered Obama officials were planning military operations over WhatsApp and accidentally adding journalists to the chat.
In any functioning administration, this would be a career-ending scandal. Multiple officials would be fired. Security protocols would be completely overhauled. Criminal investigations would be launched. Instead, we’re watching Republicans try to wave this away as a simple mistake — just an errant text, no big deal since the bombing worked out fine.
This isn’t just covering up incompetence anymore. This is actively endangering national security by normalizing absolutely reckless handling of classified military operations. Anyone claiming otherwise is either lying or has completely abandoned any pretense of caring about operational security when their team is in charge.