Tactical Response to Natural Gas Emergencies: Gas Explosion

In this book excerpt from Tactical Response to Natural Gas Emergencies, the authors recount the incident they experienced which ultimately became the basis for this book.

Like other lucky firefighters that survived a gas explosion, Captain Patterson and I survived our burns, broken bones, concussions, numerous injuries and mental bruises, but it took a very long time with a lot of help from our friends and family, and yes a fair amount of counseling.

The long emotional and spiritual roller coaster that followed that “routine gas leak” changed our lives forever. That experience is the genesis for this book. I did not know this for several years until Fire Engineering’s editor Bobby Halton wrote about post traumatic growth.  Post traumatic growth is the positive side of experiences like this.  It can drive you to new levels of understanding, research, professionalism and to set and achieve new, lofty goals.  This book is the result of that experience and growth and my partnership with Brian.  The goal:  To provide our nations firefighters with a summary of what you need to know about natural gas emergencies in one concise training manual.

Those times of spiritual reflection punctuated by intense anger, the emotional dives and soaring spiritual experiences, drove me to use that long recovery time to learn why this incident went bad and what else can we do to better respond to natural gas (NG) leaks?  Dan Moran, the Rockland County Fire Coordinator for Hazardous Materials, a good friend and better listener, recognized the importance of my goal and became an active partner in our quest for excellence.  He helped me answer the question, “How could this happen?”  I had been in the Fire Service for 37years, had seen my share of fires and emergencies, was a former paramedic and the chief of our county hazmat team, was a constant student of our game, was a trainee in every fire and hazmat course I could get to (which was a lot), had received a degree in fire protection, had authored a book on house fires, and had taught at FDIC for the past 12 years as well as all around our nation. I had the 4-gas meter with me. Who is safer than me at this call?

The simple answer is that I did not know what I did not know (fig. 1), which is exactly what one of America’s most veteran astronauts John Young said about the Challenger disaster: “It was one of those cases of not knowing what we did not know—and that is the most dangerous kind.”

Next are some of the most important things I did not know (that nearly killed me) and you probably don’t know either. At first I thought, this wasn’t my first gas leak, and with all my training and experience how could I be so dumb to miss these important points? But as Dan and I waded through what I did and did not do on the scene and talked with experts around our nation, we realized I was never trained to the level that was needed. You may not be either. The goal of this book is to fill that gap for you, your company, and your department. 

So, the purpose of this book is to share these critical facts with you as well as how to convey them to your members. Like we tell firefighters in our Tactical Response to Natural Gas Emergencies class, “Don’t worry; you will feel uncomfortable because you think you should know this stuff. But, and it’s a big but, you don’t know it because you were never trained to know and understand these things.” Additionally, next I will summarize critical facts and tell you why I did not know and why you probably don’t know them. This will help you understand the need to include procedures in your gas response SOPs. Each of these will be explained in great detail in the following chapters. 

10 Critical Facts I Did Not Know

1. A metal oxide–based explosive gas detector will detect low levels of gas that your 4-gas will not. Always pair up an inexpensive metal oxide– based explosive gas detector with your 4-gas monitor to increase your safety and effectiveness. Chapter 4 contains all these important details.
   
2. Although we had been on scene for 43 minutes before the explosion, we did not know there was a lengthy delay in calling the FD. Gas migrated underground, driven by a 2″, 60-psi main, took the path of least resistance for as much as an hour before the house exploded. The FD operation for evacuation moved from the outside of the kill box toward the leak. We should have started nearest the leak site and evacuated outward. This was not included in any training I attended. Chapter 6 covers underground leaks, and chapter 13 covers training you can do for your members.
   
3. Gas was escaping back into the trench on the side of the road where the boring device was placed before it hit the gas main under the street. In the trench I saw the soil was dancing (driven by pressurized escaping gas). My training taught me it was lighter than air, no problem. However, not all the gas was escaping; some was migrating under- ground. The gas company never fully explained underground gas migration in their short slideshows. The frost layer in the ground pre-vented the gas from escaping, so it took the path of least resistance, into a nearby house. None of my training included how to factor the ground’s frost layer into my size-up. The gas could have gone into multiple buildings, like what occurred in Lafayette, Indiana, in 2002, when four buildings exploded. The statutory requirement for training firefighters is vague, and the utility was doing it at an awareness-level training. As you know, FDs operate at the technician and command level at NGEs, far beyond awareness training, and they need the overall understanding that advanced training provides. Chapter 6 will discuss underground gas migration in detail. 
   
4. The gas technicians on the scene asked us to force the door to the last house in question. It was locked and closest to the break. Forcing entry into a building containing gas and numerous ignition sources is like Russian roulette. Your turnout gear will not protect you from a bomb like this … a big bomb. Chapter 7 covers locked buildings that may contain gas.
   
5. Gas techs are trained to measure NG in percent volume of gas. Firefighters use instruments that measure percent of the lower explosive limit (LEL). When the gas tech says 10%, he means 10% gas, right in the middle of the explosive range, probably where the house in this case history was, judging by the force of the blast. But 10% to firefighters means only 10% of the LEL. Not a really dangerous place to be. Chapter 2 covers important chemical and physical properties of NG, and chapter 4 contains a conversion chart so you can understand the utility techs’ readings.
   
6. Trust but verify that what the gas techs are asking you to do is in compliance with procedures. The FD is responsible for life safety of both civilians and firefighters. As President Reagan said, “Trust but verify.” Firefighters often trust the gas techs and will blindly comply with their requests. However, just because they show up in shiny trucks with nice uniforms does not mean you should trust them with the lives of your crew and civilians. An example of this is in New York City where, as a result of a 2014 NG explosion that claimed eight lives, the utility was fined $153 million. In the words of the final report, “The 20-month-long Department-led (NY Department of Public Service) investigation determined that Con Edison failed to adhere to nearly a dozen state gas safety requirements and found that several of these contributed to the explosion.” Chapters 5 through 11 provide sample procedures you can use to improve your current SOPs.
   
7. You have no plan B if things go bad. Your gear will not provide protection from an explosion. In fact, Kenny and I were burned in the same spots on our heads from the friction of our helmets flying off. No, I did not have a chin strap on, and that probably helped save my life.
   
8. SOPs are weak. I have reviewed and helped some major FDs improve their gas response SOPs. Most have some basic dos and don’ts, but they generally lack sequential procedures, forcing the FD officer in command (OIC) to make them up on the scene. Can you imagine a paramedic doing the same thing? The medic conversation may go like this: “Hey Bob, we shocked the last guy that had a heart rhythm like this … let’s try some drugs this time?” “Yea, Bill, let’s try some epi and maybe some atropine and see how that works.” Medic protocols are based on best practices, research, and experience … FD gas response protocols should be as well. Chapter 5 provides tips on your SOPs.
   
9. How much air monitoring training have you had?  Your chief probably bought several meters and handed them to you or your crew. Chapter 4 will fill in the blanks for you for this critically important topic.  I should have had an explosive gas detector with me to compliment my 4-gas.  It would have detected low levels of escaping gas faster than the 4-gas.
   
10. Life safety is the FD’s mission, not to find and fix the leak. This is the bottom line. We are responsible for the life safety of civilians and our members. The utility’s job is to find and fix. It is important to under- stand the utility has a profit-based agenda. The faster they can fix the problem and make the customer happy, the better they are. The fewer customers they can shut off due to a leak, the less paperwork they have to submit to their state regulators. The important point here is this: there are no good guys and bad guys here, but there is a very different perspective for the players responding to this leak. Utility people will argue differently, but the fact is obvious, and we have all seen it and experienced it. Chapter 5 provides a great case history.

Additional Sources