Middle East War: A Boost for Renewables?
The Middle East war has triggered a global energy crisis. South Asia was the first region to feel the impact, followed by Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, with Europe expected to face the strongest pressure in April, according to Shell CEO Wael Sawan. The disruption of shipping routes has also affected agricultural markets, as roughly one-third of the global seaborne fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. If the conflict continues, it is likely to accelerate the diversification of oil and gas supplies and force some countries to return to coal in the short term. More importantly, however, the situation is expected to give a strong boost to renewable energy worldwide. Renewables are no longer driven only by climate policy or cost considerations but increasingly by the need for energy security. In this context, dependence on rare earth materials may no longer appear to be a critical constraint compared with the strategic risks associated with fossil fuel supply disruptions.
Oil prices surged after the escalation of the Iran crisis and the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, rising above $100 per barrel. Gas markets were also hit. In March 2026, QatarEnergy declared force majeure on several long-term LNG supply contracts after missile strikes caused severe damage to facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City. According to the company’s CEO, Saad al-Kaabi, the strikes affected infrastructure responsible for roughly 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity, and restoring these volumes could take between three and five years.
The halt in Qatari LNG production removed around 80 million tons per year from the market, equivalent to nearly 19% of global supply. On Mar. 19, Wood Mackenzie warned that the North Field East expansion in Qatar, originally expected to start production in November 2026, will likely be delayed until 2027–28. This delay would postpone roughly 32 million tons/yr of new LNG supply, further tightening the global supply–demand balance at a time when markets are already under strong geopolitical pressure.
The conflict may also affect US suppliers. Freeport CEO Michael Smith stated that the war-related disruptions could delay new US LNG projects, as the crisis is affecting the availability of key materials, including steel and specialized components required for the construction of liquefaction plants.
Diversification and Switch to Coal
Analysts expect that persistently high gas prices will trigger gas-to-coal switching in both Europe and Asia, as power producers search for cheaper and more reliable fuel sources. At the same time, the crisis is likely to accelerate changes in purchasing patterns, with consumers seeking to reduce dependence on Mideast Gulf suppliers and increase imports from exporters considered to carry lower political risk and more secure delivery routes.
This rebalancing of trade flows could benefit producers in North America, Australia, Africa, and potentially Russia, while weakening the position of suppliers directly affected by the conflict. China may also reassess the risks associated with heavy reliance on LNG imports and reconsider previously delayed pipeline projects, including Line D of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline and a possible acceleration of the Power of Siberia-2 project with Russia.
In this context, it is notable that on Mar. 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for deeper cooperation in the natural gas sector during a visit to Beijing of Turkmenistan’s leader, Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov. The statement signals Beijing’s intention to strengthen pipeline-based supply options and reduce exposure to maritime chokepoints.
At the same time, other major consumers are likely to turn to the US as a more secure source of LNG supply, reinforcing the role of North American exports in the global gas market despite the risk of delays to new projects caused by supply-chain disruptions.
Renewables for Energy Security
The current hostilities may provide an additional boost to renewable energy as well as to nuclear. As supply disruptions expose the strategic vulnerabilities associated with fossil fuel trade, governments are likely to place greater emphasis on domestic and diversified energy sources. In this environment, renewables gain importance not only because of climate policy or cost-competitiveness but also because they reduce exposure to geopolitical risk, maritime chokepoints and supply shocks.
The current crisis reinforces the view that energy security considerations can accelerate the deployment of wind, solar and storage even in countries that had previously prioritized conventional fuels. For countries such as China, the crisis will represent an opportunity not to be missed, as the disruption in fossil fuel markets is likely to accelerate demand for renewable technologies. Since the outbreak of the conflict, capital has been flowing into Chinese companies involved in solar, wind, batteries, and electric vehicles, reflecting expectations that concerns over energy security will accelerate the shift toward renewables.
Renewables’ Progress Comparison
The US, which is described by some as a “petrostate,” has shown strong progress in renewable energy despite relatively low energy prices and current policy efforts to reduce fiscal incentives for wind and solar. In 2025, electricity generation from renewable energy sources grew by 10%, reaching more than 26% of total US power supply. The US Energy Information Administration also estimates that around 93% of new generation capacity to be added in 2026 will come from wind, solar and battery storage.
The achievements of China, the leading “electrostate,” are even more significant. China’s electricity consumption increased by about 5% year on year in 2025, while renewable capacity expanded much faster. By the end of November 2025, installed wind and solar capacity had grown by roughly 34% compared with the previous year. Non-fossil fuel power sources accounted for more than 60% of total installed capacity, making them the dominant component of the power system, and approximately one-third of electricity consumed in China now comes from renewable sources.
Growth in another major “electrostate,” the EU, has been slower, but its share of renewable energy remains among the highest in the world. In 2025, over 47% of electricity generated in the EU came from low-carbon and renewable sources.
Longer-Term Considerations
The conflict will need to be resolved in a way that restores full confidence in the security of energy deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz. For consumers, it is not enough that flows resume, the route must be perceived as reliable and no longer exposed to recurring geopolitical risk.
Reestablishing trust in safe and uninterrupted shipments will likely take months at best and more realistically, years. Even relatively short-lived gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 triggered structural changes in the European gas market. Those crises accelerated the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor initiative and contributed to the construction of the Nord Stream pipelines, as both buyers and sellers sought supply routes.
The current hostilities in the Middle East already represent an even larger shock for global energy markets, as they affect the world’s most critical oil and LNG transit corridor. The long-term impact on trade flows, infrastructure investment and supplier preferences is therefore likely to be deeper and global in scale. The current supply crisis — rather than high prices alone — may not be felt equally in Washington, but it is likely to raise serious concerns in Brussels and Beijing.
If the conflict in the Gulf is prolonged, it could become a strong economic and political argument for accelerating the energy transition, as governments seek to reduce exposure to supply disruptions linked to fossil fuel trade routes.
Danila Bochkarev is an independent analyst covering Eurasia energy issues. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.