Extra! 10 Questions Washington Reporters Need to Ask Right Now
Welcome to Second Rough Draft, a newsletter about journalism in our time, how it (often its business) is evolving, and the challenges it faces. This is a special editiion, reflecting breaking news.
People ask a lot these days what they can do in the face of the damage being done by Donald Trump and his cronies. This week we have a good answer for journalists covering the White House, State Department, Defense Department, intelligence community and Congress: They can ask questions about yesterday’s astonishing story in the Atlantic about a chat group that, for two days, discussed the March 15 US attack on Houthis in Yemen, and then received the plans for that attack from the Secretary of Defense.
The chat was convened by the White House national security adviser, and included the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence, the White House chief of staff and others. The editor of the Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, was, apparently mistakenly, added to the chat group at its outset. I assume you’ve read the story, but if not, do so right now.
Yesterday morning the National Security Council spokesman confirmed the authenticity of the message chain to the Atlantic. Last night, the Secretary of Defense denied that what Goldberg described as “war plans” were. This morning the White House press secretary said on Twitter and the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of Central Intelligence both testified to a Senate committee that none of the information in the chat was classified. All of those statements appear to be lies.
The Speaker of the House admitted yesterday that a mistake had been made, and the President said this morning that the national security adviser has “learned a lesson.”
All of that said, I hope the Atlantic will now publish the full chat. If any damage to the national security ensues, given the insistence that none of this is classified, the responsibility would rest with the Administration. The benefits in allowing the American people to gauge the recklessness for themselves would be considerable.
What follows are some of the initial questions to which the American people deserve answers. In another time, those would come from a special prosecutor appointed by the Justice Department or from congressional hearings. But the current Justice Department lacks the integrity to investigate this very serious breach of security, and the current congressional majorities lack the courage to probe shortcomings in the Administration.
Here are the questions:
The group chat was conducted on Signal, a private app developed by a non-profit, with one of the two lead developers being the co-founder of What’sApp, which is now owned by Facebook. While Signal is widely used in the private sector, including by journalists in Washington (and sometimes by me), it is a private communications vehicle. Is it approved for confidential discussions of American foreign and defense policy at the highest levels? If so, who approved this, and when did it occur? Also if so, what is the basis for believing Signal to be sufficiently secure for this purpose?
The national security adviser appears to have started the text chain on his personal phone. (This can be inferred from his having Goldberg’s phone in his contacts.) Were each of the other participants using their personal phones for this conversation? In any case„ who approved the use of personal phones in this way and when?
Many high ranking public officials are provided with secure phones. Is Signal permitted to be installed on such phones? If so, who approved this and when?
Nothing in the chain that has been disclosed indicates that this was a new way of communicating for those involved, and all involved already seem to have had Signal installed on the devices they used. When did the use of Signal to communicate about sensitive foreign and defense issues begin? Who approved it? How often has it been employed? Has anyone ordered since yesterday that it cease? If so, who and when?
The messages in the chain in question were set to automatically delete over time. This would indicate an attempt to defeat the legal requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which otherwise would require the disclosure, upon public request, of many of the texts in the chain, especially if, as asserted, they were unclassified. Avoidance of FOIA (and congressional oversight) was almost certainly the motivation for Hillary Clinton’s use of a private server while serving as Secretary of State. Many of those on the chain publicly criticized Clinton for that. Who approved the practice of deleting the messages and when? What was the legal basis for this? Have the officials who once criticized Clinton changed their views? In any event, have the people involved now taken steps to prevent any further deletions of messages and their preservation for FOIA and eventual oversight purposes?
At least one participant in the chain, White House negotiator Steve Witkoff, was in a foreign country—in his case, Russia—while on the chain. Even if Signal itself is secure, personal devices in hostile countries are believed to be more vulnerable to hacking. Were participants authorized to take personal devices on which they were discussing sensitive foreign and defense matters into other countries, including such nations as Russia and China? Who authorized this and when?
NPR reports this morning that the Pentagon warned of a vulnerability in Signal, particularly with respect to Russian hackers, a week ago, before the Atlantic had asked about the text chain. Did that warning relate in any way to these events? To Witkoff’s use of Signal while in Russia?
Did anyone on a chat at any time notice that a “JG” was included in the group? If so, did they inquire in any way as to that person’s identity?
Is any damage assessment planned as a result of the revelation of this group chat, and other uses of Signal for similar purposes? If so, who is conducting that assessment, and what assurances are there of the independence and integrity of that assessment?
What about a legal assessment? Some legal experts believe that the national security adviser, in his gross negligence here, may have violated the Espionage Act. The same could apply to anyone who noticed the presence of a “JG” they did not know. And again, if that is being evaluated, what guarantees of independent judgment do we have?
All of these questions need to be posed to each of the chat participants—and, if necessary, repeatedly. Until they are answered. Our readers, listeners and viewers deserve no less.
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