Climate Litigation Updates (October 23, 2025)

FEATURED U.S. CASE

Montana Federal Court Dismissed Youth Plaintiffs’ Challenge to President Trump’s Executive Orders on Energy; Plaintiffs Filed Appeal

The federal district court for the District of Montana ruled that youth plaintiffs lacked standing for their lawsuit challenging three of President Trump’s energy-related executive orders. The plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders and agency actions implementing them would increase use of fossil fuels, slow development of renewable energy, and curtail availability of science research. They asserted that the defendants’ actions constituted ultra vires exercises of power and violations of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights to life and liberty. In considering whether the plaintiffs established the prerequisites for standing, the court first found that the plaintiffs established an injury in fact sufficient for standing by alleging “overwhelming evidence that climate change is affecting them now in concrete ways, and that these effects will imminently worsen as a result of” the three executive orders. The court further found that expert affidavits filed in support of the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction sufficiently established that the three executive orders “will render a meaningful contribution to atmospheric carbon dioxide levels,” satisfying the standing requirement that alleged injuries be “fairly traceable” to the challenged actions. The district court concluded, however, that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Juliana v. United States foreclosed the existence of the redressability element of standing. The district court found that it was unlikely that a declaration of the executive orders’ illegality would redress the plaintiffs’ injuries by “revert[ing] the entirety of the United States’s energy policy back to January 19” (the day before President Trump took office). The court also found that it was unclear whether recent Supreme Court precedent that “looked favorably” upon arguments that “injuries would be substantially ameliorated” by a judicial decision would provide sufficient support for the youth plaintiffs’ contention that the injunctive relief they sought would satisfy the redressability element. The court concluded, however, that even if there were a substantial likelihood that the injunctive relief sought would redress their injuries, the plaintiffs could not surmount the “final, dispositive hurdle” that the relief sought would be outside the court’s power to grant. The court viewed the relief sought as raising the same concerns regarding judicial power that were at issue in Juliana: that granting an injunction would require the court “to scrutinize every climate-related agency action taken since January 20, 2025” to determine whether they were implemented pursuant to the allegedly illegal executive orders. The court expressed concerns regarding the scope of the requested injunction and its potential for requiring the court to engage in policymaking. The court concluded that “Plaintiffs’ compelling case for redress must be made to the political branches or to the electorate.” Because the court viewed any amendment of the plaintiffs’ complaint as futile, it dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on October 20. Lighthiser v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00054 (D. Mont. Oct. 15, 2025)

DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Supreme Court Declined to Consider Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge to Washington Cap-and-Trade Law

The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to the owners of a natural gas power plant in Washington who asked the Court to consider their claim that Washington’s Climate Commitment Act violates the dormant Commerce Clause by distributing “no-cost allowances” for power plants owned by in-state utilities while requiring the owners of independent power plants to purchase allowances. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in December 2024 that the owners failed to state a viable dormant Commerce Clause claim. Invenergy Thermal LLC v. Watson, No. 24-1027 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2025)

D.C. Circuit Upheld Environmental Review for Natural Gas Pipeline Serving Coal-to-Gas Transition at Tennessee Power Plant

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied Sierra Club’s petitions for review challenging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC’s) environmental review and authorization for a 32-mile natural gas pipeline that would feed a natural gas turbine replacement for a coal-fired unit at Tennessee Valley Authority’s Cumberland Fossil Plant. Citing deference due to agencies’ National Environmental Policy Act reviews under the U.S. Supreme Court’s May 2025 decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v.  Eagle County, the D.C. Circuit found that Sierra Club’s challenges to FERC’s analysis of impacts were meritless. First, the D.C. Circuit found that FERC properly assessed the pipeline’s downstream greenhouse gas emissions, rejecting Sierra Club’s position that FERC erred by crediting the pipeline with enabling emissions reductions resulting from the power plant’s transition from coal to gas and also rejecting contentions that FERC should have presented cumulative rather than annualized estimates of emissions. Second, the D.C. Circuit concluded that FERC’s consideration of a no-action alternative that still included a natural gas turbine replacing the coal-fired unit was not inconsistent with FERC’s consideration of net reductions in greenhouse gas emissions as a benefit of the pipeline. Third, the D.C. Circuit found that FERC did not err by not analyzing the pipeline and power plant together as connected actions. The court concluded that after Seven County agencies are no longer required to analyze the impacts of actions (in this case the power plant) over which they do not exercise regulatory authority. One judge did not join this portion of the opinion, but the D.C. Circuit further found that even assuming the connected-action requirement applied, the error was harmless because Sierra Club did not identify additional information a review of connected actions would provide that was not already in FERC’s environmental impact statement. The D.C. Circuit also determined that FERC complied with Natural Gas Act when it confirmed a market need for the pipeline project, rejecting Sierra Club’s argument that FERC needed to consider green energy subsidies available under the Inflation Reduction Act. In addition, the D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s balancing of the pipeline’s benefits and harms under the Natural Gas Act, finding that Sierra Club’s argument “simply repeats objections that we have already considered and rejected” regarding the adequacy of the environmental review. In a conclusion that was not joined by one of the three judges on the panel, the D.C. Circuit stated that Sierra Club’s arguments “depended on circuit precedent abrogated by Seven County,” including the 2017 Sabal Trail decision requiring FERC to consider power plant emissions that pipelines make possible even though FERC lacks regulatory jurisdiction over power generation facilities. The conclusion stated that “[a]fter Seven County, the era of searching NEPA review is over—or at least it should be.”Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Nos. 24-1099, 24-1198 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 2025)

Second Circuit Upheld District Court Decision Ordering Oil Companies to Pay Portion of New York City’s Attorney Fees for Unsuccessful Removal of Climate Case

In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered fossil fuel companies to pay New York City for attorneys’ fees and costs related to the companies’ removal to federal court of the City’s suit alleging the companies violated the City’s Consumer Protection Law by misleading consumers about the climate change risks of their products and their commitments to renewable and alternative energy sources. The district court awarded the City fees for five of the six bases for removal asserted by the companies but only for work performed and costs incurred after the Second Circuit affirmed a remand order in September 2023 in a similar case brought by the State of Connecticut. The parties stipulated that the companies would pay the City $68,262.46 if the award of fees was affirmed on appeal. The Second Circuit first rejected Exxon’s contention that the district court erred by awarding fees and costs despite determining that one of the rejected bases for removal (diversity jurisdiction) was “objectively reasonable.” The Second Circuit found that in this case “unusual circumstances” were clearly present that justified assessment of fees and costs, including the rejection by eight circuit courts of appeals and at least 11 district courts of arguments opposing remand in similar cases around the country. The Second Circuit also found that the record supported application of the “unusual circumstances” exception even though the district court did not invoke it. The court found, moreover, that the record made clear that the district court believed the removal presented “unusual circumstances” even if it did not use that phrase. The Second Circuit also disagreed with the companies’ second argument that the district court should have considered the validity of their removal jurisdiction arguments based on the state of the law in 2021 when they initially removed the case and not in November 2023 when they renewed their opposition to remand. The Second Circuit also found that the extent of the award was reasonable, noting that the district court “exercised its discretion to award fees and costs in a measured way—that is, only with respect to fees associated with the objectively unreasonable grounds for removal and only for work required after the legal landscape had shifted significantly.” The dissenting judge would have found that the combination of the two errors identified by the defendants required reversal or vacatur and remand of the fees and costs award. He wrote that “[w]hat is frivolous in this case is the claim, not its removal,” considering that the City’s case had been dismissed “under the indulgent New York pleading standard.” He conclude that “[i]n any event, a party that uses a local consumer protection law to combat global climate change should not be compensated on the premise that the other side is filing frivolous papers.” On October 17, the companies filed a petition for rehearing en banc. City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 24-1568 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2025)

Federal Court Denied Preliminary Injunction to Block Export-Import Bank Funding for Mozambique LNG Project; Opinion Sealed

The federal district court in the District of Columbia denied environmental organizations’ motion for a preliminary injunction blocking the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) from disbursing funding for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Mozambique. EXIM originally approved a $5 billion loan in 2019 and a revised loan of $4.7 billion in 2020; in 2021, the project’s sponsor suspended the project and eventually declared force majeure due to insurgent attacks in the region. In March 2025, the EXIM Board, made up of one Senate-confirmed member and two acting members appointed by President Trump, again approved the $4.7 billion loan. The organizations claimed in their lawsuit that EXIM violated the Export Import Bank Act of 1945 and EXIM procedures, and also that EXIM failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act’s environmental review requirements. The district court sealed its decision regarding the preliminary injunction, and the court directed the parties to confer regarding whether the court should redact any portions of the decision before making an unsealed version public. Friends of the Earth US v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 1:25-cv-02235 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2025)

Louisiana Federal Court Said Withdrawals of Offshore Lands from Oil and Gas Development Exceeded President’s Authority

The federal district court for the Western District of Louisiana declared that President Biden’s January 2025 withdrawals of certain areas of the Outer Continental Shelf from potential oil and gas leasing were unlawful because they exceeded his authority under Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which authorizes the President to withdraw unleased lands from disposition. As a threshold matter, the court reiterated its earlier determination that President Trump’s rescission of President Biden’s memoranda withdrawing the lands did not moot the challenge to the withdrawals. The court also found that the necessary adversarial relationship between the parties existed since intervening environmental organizations “oppose plaintiffs at every point.” In addition, the court found that Louisiana and the other plaintiffs had met minimal standing requirements to assert procedural right and that the plaintiffs properly pled ultra vires claims that did not require a waiver of sovereign immunity under OCSLA. On the merits, the court held that OCSLA Section 12(a)’s language “itself establishes that withdrawals must be subject to reversal or modification.” The court also cited presidential interpretations of this “limited authority” that supported this reading. The court noted that President Biden’s withdrawals (as well as earlier withdrawals by President Obama) “purported to apply for ‘a period of time without specific expiration,’ i.e., indefinitely.” The court ruled that “[t]o the extent these were indeed supposed to overcome the power of subsequent executives to revoke or modify their withdrawals, they constituted a departure from the executive branch’s longstanding practice and exceed the authority granted under § 12(a).” Because the court concluded that President Biden’s withdrawals exceeded presidential authority under OCSLA, the court did not consider the plaintiff states’ constitutional challenges to OSCLA § 12(a). Louisana v. Biden, No. 2:25-cv-00071 (W.D. La. Oct. 2, 2025)

Puerto Rico Federal Court Ordered Preparation of EIS for Post-Hurricane Funding for Restoration of Utility Systems

The federal district court for the District of Puerto Rico ruled that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should have prepared an environmental impact statement for the provision of funding to restore utilities damaged by Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico and to increase their future resiliency. The plaintiffs—community and environmental groups who the court concluded had standing—charged that the defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by, among other things, failing to consider distributed renewable energy alternatives and failing to adequately examine environmental harms associated with rebuilding the fossil fuel grid. The court stated that it could “not see how FEMA could argue that there is no substantial possibility that the projects contemplated … could significantly affect the quality of the human environment,” necessitating preparation of an EIS under the NEPA. The court was not persuaded by FEMA’s arguments that FEMA was not required to analyze alternatives not submitted by project applicants, that renewable energy alternatives did not meet the purposes and need of the action, and that FEMA was required to give substantial weight to applicants’ preferences. The court found, however, that FEMA’s separate programmatic environmental assessment (PEA) for funding to restore public facilities was sufficient. The court noted that the PEA for public facilities did not encompass restoration or replacement of energy infrastructure and that the plaintiffs did not identify language in the PEA limiting the reestablishment of power in public facilities to fossil fuel-powered electricity. Comité Dialogo Ambiental v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, No. 1:23-cv-00984 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2025) 

Puerto Rico Federal Court Dismissed San Juan’s Climate Claims Against Fossil Fuel Companies

The federal district court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the Municipality of San Juan’s claims asserting that fossil fuel industry defendants concealed the relationship between their products and “catastrophic weather phenomena” such as the 2017 hurricanes that caused substantial damage to San Juan. The court rejected San Juan’s efforts to distinguish its case from the case brought by other Puerto Rico municipalities, which a sister court in the District of Puerto Rico dismissed on September 11, 2025. (The plaintiffs in that case filed a notice of appeal on October 7.) The court said that San Juan’s contention that the decision in the other case relied on the absence of further proof that could be obtained in discovery was contradicted by San Juan’s arguments opposing further discovery in its objections to a magistrate judge’s July 2025 report and recommendations. The district court also found that San Juan raised no new arguments to counter the court’s conclusion in the other case that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, antitrust, and Puerto Rico law claims should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds against the defendants over whom the court had jurisdiction. Municipality of San Juan v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:23-cv-01608 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2025)

Texas Federal Court Denied Monetary Damages for American Airlines’ ESG-Related Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Retirement Plan Participant but Issued Injunction

More than eight months after finding that American Airlines, Inc. (American) and the American Airlines Employee Benefits Committee (EBC) breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by allowing corporate interests in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives and their investment manager’s ESG interests to influence their management of employee retirement plans, the federal district court for the Northern District of Texas denied the plaintiff’s request for monetary damages. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently establish actual monetary losses to the retirement plans (Plan). The court determined, however, that it was necessary to award equitable relief “to ensure that Defendants and their investment managers act solely for the pecuniary benefit of the [retirement plans] and implement compliance measures to ensure fidelity to ERISA’s fiduciary standards.” The court permanently enjoined the defendants from permitting “any proxy voting, shareholder proposals, or other stewardship activities on behalf of the Plan that are motivated by or directed towards non-pecuniary ends, including but not limited to ESG-oriented investment management and objectives, that are not in the exclusive best financial interest of Plan participants and beneficiaries.” The injunction also required appointment of two independent members of the EBC without any connection to any administrator, advisor, or investment manager of retirement plan assets. The injunctive relief also required annual certification to each retirement plan participant that the EBC and each manager of plan assets “will only and solely pursue investment objectives based on provable financial performance, not DEI, ESG, sustainability, or any other nonfinancial criteria” and will only allow proxy votes to be cast on behalf of plan participants “solely to maximize the long-term financial returns of Plan participants’ investments, and not DEI, ESG, sustainability, or other non-financial criteria.” In addition, American must post information concerning any membership in organizations “principally devoted to achieving DEI, ESG, climate-focused investment or stewardship objectives,” including UN PRI, Net Zero Asset Managers Initiatives, and Ceres Investor Network, and link to the terms and conditions of such memberships. Spence v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4:23-cv-00552 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2025)

Oregon Federal Court Said Endangered Species Act Rules for Streaked Horned Lark Were Arbitrary and Capricious

The federal district court for the District of Oregon remanded a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) final rule listing the streaked horned lark as threatened rather than endangered and vacated a Section 4(d) rule under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that extended certain ESA protections for endangered species to the lark. The court found that the listing determination was arbitrary and capricious, including because FWS failed to consider the impact that small population size presently had on the lark. Among the issues identified by the court was the final rule’s failure to “meaningfully analyze small population size in connection with climate change.” Regarding the Section 4(d) rule, the court found that there appeared to be no evidence supporting the rule’s expansion of an exception to the take prohibition for agricultural activity to the entirety of the lark’s range. Center for Biological Diversity v. Burgum, No. 3:23-cv-00150 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2025)

D.C. Circuit Denied Rehearing on AIM Act Rule Implementing HFC Phasedown

Less than two months after denying challenges to a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule setting an allocation methodology for hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) allowances for 2024 through 2028 as part of the cap-and-trade program to implement the HFC phasedown required by the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act (AIM Act), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc filed by a company that imports, produces, and sells refrigerants. The company—which contended that EPA’s allocation rule gave other entities, including end-users such as the government, more than 20% of the company’s market share—argued in its rehearing petition that en banc review was warranted to consider the whether the AIM Act provided insufficient guidance to EPA in violation of the nondelegation doctrine; that the panel disregarded statutory text and interpretation principles and improperly deferred to EPA to supply “an intelligible principle that is otherwise lacking”; and that the EPA rule was at odds with the court’s interpretation of the AIM Act. No member of the court requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. IGas Holdings Inc v. EPA, Nos. 23-1261, 23-1263 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 2025)

Louisiana Trial Court Vacated State Permit for Liquefied Natural Gas Facility

A Louisiana District Court vacated a Coastal Use Permit issued by the Louisiana Department of Energy and Natural Resources Office of Coastal Management (OCM) for Commonwealth LNG, LLC’s construction and operation of a natural gas liquefaction, storage, and export facility in Cameron Parish. The court found that OCM failed to consider the facility’s secondary and cumulative impacts related to climate change. Although OCM argued that consideration of potential effects on global warming and climate change were outside its jurisdictional grant of authority under the legislative directives establishing the Louisiana Coastal Resources Program, the court found that the petitioners sought consideration not of the facility’s global climate change impacts but of “how this facility’s impact on climate change, if any, will exacerbate local impacts within the Coastal Zone of Louisiana.” The court further found that the Program’s statute and guidelines, “augmented by the Louisiana Constitution,” mandated consideration of impacts in combination with the impacts two other nearby LNG facilities, including potential impacts on storm severity or sea level rise. Based on the presence of these three LNG facilities within a few miles of each other, the court distinguished Healthy Gulf v. Secretary, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, which upheld a failure to consider global impacts of climate change. The court also found that OCM failed to consider environmental justice; the court rejected a claim that OCM failed to adequately address the risks of explosions, leaks, and other accidents. Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department of Energy & Natural Resources, No. 10-21077 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 10, 2025)

NEW CASES AND FILINGS

Iowa Counties Asked Supreme Court to Consider Whether Federal Law Preempts Local Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Pipelines

Two Iowa counties and officials in those counties filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of an appellate court decision that ruled that federal law preempted their local laws regulating carbon dioxide pipelines. The petition presented the question of “[w]hether a state or local law regulating the location or routing of an interstate pipeline is a preempted ‘safety standard’ under the Pipeline Safety Act when a court concludes that the law was primarily motivated by safety concerns.” Shelby County v. Couser, No. 25-419 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2025)

Preliminary Injunctive Relief Sought to Protect Salmon and Steelhead in Columbia River Basin

National Wildlife Federation and other organizations (NWF) and the State of Oregon filed motions for preliminary injunctions seeking to require the Bureau of Reclamation and other federal defendants to implement measures in the operation and maintenance of the Columbia River System’s dams and reservoirs to protect salmon and steelhead listed under the Endangered Species Act. They filed their motions after the Trump administration withdrew from a memorandum of understanding that specified interim parameters for the system’s operation. In support of its motion, NWF argued that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the defendants violated the ESA, including by failing to analyze whether the management of the Columbia River System would avoid jeopardy to the listed species in a future that includes climate change. NWF contended that the 2020 biological opinion prepared for the proposed action engaged “willful blindness to the real-world effects” and was arbitrary and capricious. Oregon’s motion asserted that climate change increased the risk of irreparable harm to listed species. Oregon argued that the measures sought in the preliminary injunction motion would reduce irreparable harm and “stave off near-term extinction for many listed populations” until a more comprehensive solution was reached. National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 3:01-cv-00640 (D. Or. Oct. 14, 2025)

Center for Biological Diversity Lawsuit Asked Court to Compel Critical Habitat Designation for Caribbean Seabird

Center for Biological Diversity filed lawsuit in the federal district court in the District of Columbia seeking to compel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate critical habitat for the endangered black-capped petrel, a medium-sized seabird that breeds and nests in the high elevations of the Caribbean. The complaint asserted that the failure to designate critical habitat violated FWS’s mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act. The complaint identified threats faced by the petrel—including habitat loss, disorientation due to artificial lighting, oil spills, fatal collisions with offshore structures, and exposure to produced water from oil and natural gas extraction. The complaint alleged that “[c]limate change—including increased storm intensity and frequency—further exacerbates these threats, making the designation of critical habitat essential for the survival and recovery of the species.” Center for Biological Diversity v. Burgum, No. 1:25-cv-03596 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 7, 2025)

Lawsuits Filed to Challenge EPA’s Termination of Solar for All Program

Four lawsuits were filed challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s termination of the Solar for All program. Three lawsuits were filed in federal district courts and one in the Court of Federal Claims:

• A labor organization, an individual homeowner, and nonprofit organizations who identified themselves as the “intended beneficiaries” of the Solar for All program filed a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island. They alleged that they would have benefitted directly from the program’s provision of new energy sources and its electricity cost savings. They asserted that the program’s termination violated the Administrative Procedure Act and was ultra vires, in violation of separation of powers and the Presentment Clauses. Rhode Island AFL-CIO v. EPA, No. 1:25-cv-00510 (D.R.I., filed Oct. 6, 2025)
• Harris County, Texas filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia challenging the termination. The County alleged that it was the “recipient of one of the largest Solar for All awards and leader of the Texas Solar for All Coalition” and that harms suffered by the County due to the dismantling of the program were “illustrative of the devastating harm” the action would cause nationwide. The complaint alleged that “Solar for All was an integral part of this country’s most ambitious effort to slow the climate crisis, promising millions of Americans access to affordable, clean solar energy; improved public health; American energy production and independence; resilience to grid failures in extreme weather; and hundreds of thousands of clean energy jobs.” The County asserted violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause and separation of powers principles. The County also asserted that EPA’s action was ultra vires because it was not authorized by statute and was contrary to the Constitution. Harris County v. EPA, No. 1:25-cv-03646 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 13, 2025)
• State recipients of grants under the Solar for All program filed a breach of contract action in the Court of Federal Claims alleging that EPA’s cancellation of the Solar for All program and unilateral termination of grant agreements constituted “a clear, unambiguous, and material breach of the agreements.” The complaint alleged that EPA acted based on an erroneous interpretation of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act as rescinding all appropriations related to Solar for All, not just “unobligated balances.” The plaintiffs contended that this basis for terminating the grants was also erroneous as a matter of contract law because the interpretation did not constitute grounds for termination under the grant agreements’ express terms and conditions. The complaint also asserted a breach of the grant agreements’ implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Maryland Clean Energy Center v. United States, No. 1:25-cv-01738 (Fed. Cl., filed Oct. 15, 2025)
• State recipients also filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the Western District of Washington seeking a declaration that EPA’s actions were unlawful and injunctive relief prohibiting EPA from implementing the unlawful actions and ordering EPA to reinstate the program and provide necessary administrative report to grant recipients. They asserted violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and of separation of powers constraints and the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. They also asserted a non-statutory review ultra vires claim that EPA acted in excess of its authority. Arizona v. EPA, No. 2:25-cv-02015 (W.D. Wash., filed Oct. 16, 2025)

Geothermal Project Developer Challenged Endangered Listing of Dixie Valley Toad

The developer of a geothermal power plant in Nevada filed a lawsuit in federal district court in the District of Columbia challenging emergency and final rules adding the Dixie Valley toad to the list of endangered species under the Endangered Species Act. The rules were issued in 2022. The complaint alleged that the listing was prompted by “a decade-long campaign” by Center for Biological Diversity to use the ESA to prevent construction of the geothermal plant. The complaint alleged that FWS identified the primary threat to the toad as geothermal development but that FWS’s determination that the plaintiffs’ geothermal project would endanger the toad was based on projects that use “dramatically different technology.” The complaint also alleged that FWS “speculated” about harms from factors such as climate change “without considering evidence regarding the likelihood of any one of these threats actually impacting the Dixie Valley toad or the toad’s resilience to these factors.” The developer asserted that FWS failed to apply the correct definitions of “endangered” or “threatened”; failed to consider the best available scientific and commercial information; and “failed to articulate the required rational connection between the facts before the agency in the administrative record and the decision reached to list the Dixie Valley frog” (including by failing to explain its conclusions regarding threats to the species from climate change). Ormat Nevada Inc. v. Burgum, No. 1:25-cv-03512 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 30, 2025)

Environmental Groups Challenged Montana Agency’s Second Attempt at Environmental Review for Power Plant’s Air Permit

Two environmental organizations filed a lawsuit in Montana District Court challenging the supplemental final environmental assessment (Final EA) issued by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) related to the Yellowstone County Generating Station, a 175-megawatt gas-fired power plant. The complaint alleged that the Final EA failed to adequately evaluate the environmental impacts of the plant’s greenhouse gas emissions, as required by the Montana Supreme Court in an earlier case. The plaintiffs asked the court to set aside the Final EA and to order DEQ to complete an analysis of the power plant’s direct, secondary, and cumulative impacts, in addition to no-action alternatives and potential mitigation measures in compliance with the Montana Environmental Policy Act, the Montana Supreme Court’s earlier decision, and the Montana Constitution’s environmental rights. Montana Environmental Information Center v. Montana Department of Environmental Quality, No. DV-56-2025-0001159-OC (Mont. Dist. Ct., filed Sept. 29, 2025)